Metaphysical musings from the Playa

Suffice to say that under qualia formalism both the feelings of oneness and separateness come from the properties of the mathematical object isomorphic to the phenomenology of one’s experience. In particular, the topology of such an object (and its orientability) may determine the degree to which one feels a self-other barrier. This is highly speculative, of course.

Analogous to the planetary habitable zone (neither too close to a star and thus burning nor too far and thus freezing), there might be a psychologically tolerable range for how much you believe in universal oneness. That is, it’s best to feel neither completely merged nor completely separate. Close enough that one can relate to others and not feel separate, but not so close that one’s existence feels redundant and cosmic loneliness sets in. Incidentally, this seems to be roughly the place at which Burners see themselves relative to other humans.

This from Qualia Computing, a true powerhouse of Whitmanic dynamism.

Two more excellent psychedelic links

They keep coming—we might have to start a digest/newsletter.

At Quillette, The Case for Psychedelics, which has two psychologists making the case for use on many fronts. This endorsement—not a puff piece or a hedged, tired feature about the psychedelic revival—is a big step. Happy to see it run at Quillette, an up-and-coming home for sanity and freethinking.

And at The Scientist, Decoding The Tripping Brain is a well-linked article summarizing the state of researchers’ understanding of how psychedelics fit into our wider understanding of serotonin psychopharmacology, and how their effects are made manifest on the network level.

Most semi-scientific coverage has focused on psychedelics’ molecular level of action, because this is what was established during the first era of psychedelic research. Understanding the role of psychedelics, and serotonergic compounds more generally, in modulating the activity of the default mode network, and its interaction with the salience network, provides a crucial link between the neurotransmitter level and person-level, describable effects.


Hearing the self as sound, not meaning

Ego dissolution offers vivid experiential proof, not only that things can be different, but that the self that conditions experience is just a heuristic, not an unchangeable, persisting thing.

Philip Gerrans and Chris Letheby at Aeon on psychedelics as a spur to work more constructively with the bundle of cognitive mechanisms we call the self.

One of the more exceptional pieces in the flood of recent popular work on psychedelics and cognitive psychology.